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Jeffrey Shulman*: While the jurisprudence of the 
Establishment Clause may not make much sense (common 
or otherwise) as a substantive legal matter, it does make sense 
as a series of jurisprudential maneuvers by which the Court 
has sought to make more room for religion in civic life. In 
fact, there is a method to the “massive jumble... of doctrines 
and rules” that forms the law of church-state relations. It 
is the method of a somewhat disorderly retreat from the 
Constitution’s foundational principle of disestablishment. Th e 
accommodations made by the Court to religious belief and 
conduct have allowed for discrimination against non-religion, 
edging the Court ever closer toward a non-preferentialist 
perspective. 
Or, perhaps more precisely, a nominally non-preferentialist 
perspective. For the Court’s accommodating attitude is premised 
on the privileged position of normative religious belief and 
practice. By adopting a majoritarian approach to church-state 
controversies, the Court has joined the power, the prestige, and 
the ﬁ nancial support of the government to the conventional 
theism that dominates our cultural heritage. 
But, in constitutional law as elsewhere, we should be 
careful what we ask for. As the Supreme Court continues to 
retreat from a position of separationism, the pressure to deﬁ ne 
religion—that is, to say what faith is entitled to government 
support and what faith is not—will inevitably increase. A broad 
deﬁ nition of religion guarantees a wide variety of claimants 
for government support, including some whose beliefs will 
not be tolerable to adherents of more mainstream religious 
traditions. When witches and pagans can no longer be preferred 
as a matter of constitutional law to Christians and Jews, the 
political premises of non-preferentialism would seem to be 
poorly served; and in a strange twist of constitutional history, 
the very principles by which non-preferentialists have sought 
to support religious practice should prompt a reconsideration 
of the virtue of high and impregnable walls. 
Like Benjamin Button, the Establishment Clause was 
born old. In 1947, it seemed that a strict separation of church 
and state was constitutionally required. Th e Everson Court can 
certainly lay claim to having established the high-water mark of 
separationist rhetoric, but though the Everson majority promised 
not to approve even the slightest breach in Jeﬀ erson’s wall, the 
rhetoric of that decision receded before a tide of practicality. 
Justice Black’s words delivered less than they promised, and, 
of course, the Court held that New Jersey’s reimbursement 
scheme was permissible.
Th e possibility that Everson breached the wall it purported 
to erect did not go unremarked. For Justice Jackson, the 
“undertones” of the opinion seemed utterly discordant with 
its conclusion. Jackson considered the absolute terms of the 
Establishment Clause to be necessitated by the unique volatility 
of religious controversy. In his words:  “Th at is a diﬀ erence 
which the Constitution sets up between religion and almost 
every other subject matter of legislation, a diﬀ erence which 
goes to the very root of religious freedom.”  Th at diﬀ erence, 
according to Justice Rutledge, required the court to create a 
“complete and permanent” separation of the spheres of religious 
activity and civil authority.
It is against this faith in the strength of good walls that 
we can chart the course of the Court’s modern Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. Th e post-Everson Court has sought some 
mechanism to make religion a part of the public business—that 
is, some way to read the Establishment Clause in less than 
absolute terms. Th e Lemon test reﬂ ects, in part, the separationist 
sentiment of the Everson dissenters, but it is a test that hedges 
its bets a bit too much. It objects to governmental action with 
a principal or primary eﬀ ect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 
It objects to excessive government entanglement with religion. 
Th ese qualiﬁ ers would lead (probably inevitably) to inconsistent 
results, and indeed they have. Th e purpose prong, too, is an 
invitation to messy speculation, if not outright guessing, about 
legislative intent and motive.
But if the much-maligned Lemon test is more subjective 
than its multi-part analytical structure might suggest, the 
endorsement test is truly fertile ground for shifting Supreme 
Court sentiment. Justice O’Connor’s endorsement standard is a 
model of heavy-handed wordplay. Rather than ask whether the 
government has a secular purpose or whether the government 
action has a primary eﬀ ect that advances religion, we now ask 
whether a governmental action communicates a message of 
endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement is in the 
eye—or, perhaps more accurately, in the hurt feelings—of the 
observer. To focus on the government’s communicative eﬀ ect, 
however, is to render establishment law little more than a form 
of intuition or, to use today’s vogue word, empathy. Worse, by 
substituting a vague, judicially deﬁ ned majoritarianism for the 
purported neutrality of the Lemon test, the endorsement test 
erases the perception of anyone who does perceive endorsement. 
But government support of religion is no less so because the 
majority fails to perceive that conduct as an endorsement of 
religion. Th at fact can serve only to intensify the oﬀ ense. 
In this respect, in its implicit concession to the indirect 
coercive pressures of majority sentiment, the endorsement test 
is of a piece with other jurisprudential strategies by which the 
Court seeks to secure a constitutional accommodation with 
religion. Ceremonial deism (the notion that religious practices, 
through rote repetition, may lose signiﬁ cant religious content) is 
most obviously a concession to the religious norm. Th e ubiquity 
of a religious practice ought to testify to its continuing vitality, 
a power and a vitality that are seen whenever these practices 
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are, in fact, challenged. But by some distortion of common 
sense, the pervasiveness of a practice becomes evidence of its 
innocuousness. After all, no reasonable person could object 
to what so many reasonable people say or do as a matter of 
course. A focus on history and tradition shares with ceremonial 
deism a common constitutional alchemy, likewise transforming 
what is unobjectionable to the religious majority into what is 
constitutionally normative. 
Taken together, these accommodationist strategies, by 
permitting the distribution of government recognition and 
beneﬁ ts to religious groups, have enabled the Court to adopt a 
de facto preferentialism in the name of neutrality and choice.
For, after all, it is misleading to speak of the religious 
majority as some sort of abstract entity. In our society, the 
religion of the majority is Christianity. Th e God of ceremonial 
deism, the God of our national traditions, the God who beneﬁ ts 
the most from government recognition, is the God worshiped 
by Christians. To the extent that other religions worship some 
variant of a Christian God, the religion of the majority is 
theistic. Both Jews and Christians (and post Justice Scalia’s 
McCreary dissent, we should add Muslims) can pledge their 
allegiance to one nation under (some version of ) God. In fact, 
the erasure of other religions or other religious beliefs is nowhere 
better seen than when the Court denominates prayer—and, 
remarkable to say, the prayer’s recipient—as nonsectarian.
On many occasions, the challenge to the accommodationist 
argument has come, naturally enough, from nonbelievers. 
But non-preferentialism stands for the proposition that the 
government may not discriminate among sects. Given that, 
could a believer who does not believe in God be constitutionally 
oﬀ ended by, say, the Pledge of Allegiance?  If so, then the 
Pledge would fail, even by non-preferentialist standards. Times 
and cultural norms change, and there will come a time when 
accommodationism is challenged by followers of nontheistic 
faiths. Indeed, that time has come, and it has come in part 
because the Court has determined that non-theistic systems of 
belief are, for constitutional purposes, valid religions.
Th e Court’s traditional deﬁ nition of religion was closely 
tied to a belief in God. In 1890, following Madison, the Court 
grounded its deﬁ nition of religion on the existence of a divine 
creator (and on the obligation of obedience to divine will). 
Eventually, the Court would acknowledge that religion does not 
mean, or does not have to mean, theism. Th e most generous 
deﬁ nition of religion given by the Supreme Court occurred 
in a series of decisions interpreting the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act (the “Draft”). For the Seeger Court, 
the fact that Congress used the expression “supreme being,” 
rather than the designation “God,” indicated that religious 
belief was meant to embrace all religions. Ready with a test 
for all occasions, the Court decided that “the test of belief in a 
relation to a supreme being is whether a given belief occupies 
a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that ﬁ lled by the 
orthodox belief in God.” 
For the traditional idea of God, the Court substituted Paul 
Tillich’s “God above God,” the source of some aﬃ  rmation of 
ultimate concern. It is the subjective nature of this standard that 
makes Seeger so strikingly generous. Following Tillich, the Court 
implied that everyone has an ultimate concern. In deciding 
that Seeger’s belief was equivalent to that of the Quakers, the 
Court relied on Tillich’s exuberant formulation of the test. Th is 
is Tillich: “And if that word ‘God’ has no meaning for you, 
translate it. Speak of the depths of your life, of your ultimate 
concern, of what you take seriously without reservation.” Th is 
is not an “ultimate concern” test; it is a “your ultimate concern 
test.” (Star Trekkies: take note.)  
In response, lower courts trying to deﬁ ne what is and 
is not religion adopt a variety of what might be called low-
threshold inclusion tests. Th e Court in United States v. Myers 
considered the defendant’s claim that drug use was a central 
tenet of his religion. He belonged to the Church of Marijuana 
(he was, I think, the only oﬃ  cial member of the Church of 
Marijuana, though I suspect that some of his beliefs are widely 
and enthusiastically shared). Th e Court presumed that the 
following sets of beliefs are religious: “Hari Krishnas, Bantus, 
Scientologists, Branch Davidians, Uniﬁ cation Church members, 
and Native American Church members (whether Shamanists 
or Ghost Dancers), Paganism, Pantheism, Animism, Wicca, 
Druidism, and Satanism, and what we now call mythology: 
Greek religion, Norse religion, and Roman religion.” Th e Court 
asked the obvious question: Is anything excluded? Well, the 
not-so-obvious answer:  alas, the Church of Marijuana.
Th is liberality threatens to undermine the accommodationist 
foundation of the Court’s modern church-state jurisprudence. 
For the signiﬁ cance of religious conduct cannot be measured 
only by its continuing vitality for majority religious groups. Th at 
conduct may have a diﬀ erent signiﬁ cance for minority religions. 
For some, the continued use of theistic ritual may be highly 
oﬀ ensive, and what was once a tolerable acknowledgment of 
beliefs widely held by the people of this country may amount 
today and tomorrow to the impermissible favoring of one 
religion over another. Moreover, if religious practice can lose 
its signiﬁ cance through rote repetition, it stands to reason that 
it could, under the right circumstances, regain spiritual vitality. 
If Satanists worship the archenemy of God, it’s diﬃ  cult to see 
how, from their perspective, government-sponsored use of 
God’s name is not an endorsement of a particular religion, is 
not indirect, or fairly direct, coercive pressure to conform. It 
is equally diﬃ  cult to see how the followers of God, faced with 
real religious opposition, will continue to invoke their deity’s 
name with rote repetition.
Perhaps more disconcerting to the accommodationists on 
the Court is the fact that an expansive deﬁ nition of religion 
undermines the political premises of non-preferentialism. If 
religion is meant to conserve public morals, it must ﬁ rst embody 
those morals. Th us, it is really public morality that deﬁ nes 
true religion. Minority religious groups may be perceived as 
subversive of the public order (followers of Bacchus:  take note), 
but on what basis could a non-preferentialist Court exclude 
them from public business?
My thesis is this:  In a pluralistic society, non-preferentialism 
contains the seeds of its own undoing. Th e government must 
dole out its largesse with an even hand (or one must adopt, with 
Justice Scalia, a monotheistic originalism), but by providing 
support to diverse religious groups, the government ensures 
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that the drama of religious disagreement will be played out in 
the public square and at the public trough. Th at drama may 
be bound to continue, but the courts can and should contain 
it within proper constitutional limits. Th e place to start is with 
the recognition that Jeﬀ erson’s wall stands in need of more than 
a little repair.
 
